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1996). This Act restructures how
electricity is supplied within
Pennsylvania and will introduce
competitive retail access within PP
& L's service area. The Act's
provisions will be implemented over
time, preventing full direct access to
competition until the year 2001.
SER responded by stating that PP &
L's current curtailment of electric
energy purchases injures SER's
ability to compete with PP & L in
the future. The court refused to
predict the future for the sake of
finding an antitrust violation.
Specifically, the court stated that
"[w]e cannot permit SER to pursue
such a speculative path to recovery
under the Sherman Act."
This case demonstrates that the
antitrust laws are meticulously
technical in their application. Unless
a plaintiff can demonstrate that it is
a competitor and has suffered an
injury in which the antitrust laws are
designed to protect, it does not have
standing to bring an antitrust action.
The Third Circuit was admittedly
not clairvoyant nor willing to design
case law based upon the speculation
of "unsubstantiated conclusions and
bald assertions."
Concurring Judge Said SER
Had No Duty to Sell
Exclusively to PP & L
While agreeing with the majority
opinion that SER's antitrust claim
should be dismissed, the concurring
judge reached his decision with one
clarification. Judge Stapleton did not
accept the panel's conclusion that
SER had a duty to sell exclusively to
PP & L. Although the majority
opinion stated in a footnote that
SER, under the terms of the contract
only, may sell to third parties, the
majority declared that SER can sell
to third parties only after it "pro-
vides 79.5 megawatts to PP & L."
Judge Stapleton, on the other hand,
interpreted the contract to simply
require SER to have the capacity to
satisfy PP & L's requirements - up
to 79.5 megawatts if necessary - in
excess of SER's potential sales to
third parties.
Moreover, Judge Stapleton
addressed SER's claim that it is a
competitor in the retail market. He
stated that while the Pennsylvania
Electricity Generation Customer
Choice and Competition Act will
gradually initiate competition in the
retail market, there was no competi-
tion prior to its passage. He con-
cluded that since the market was not
competitive, SER could not estab-
lish that it was PP & L's competitor,
a condition SER needed to satisfy to
prove an antitrust injury.
Finally, Judge Stapleton focused
on SER's assertion that it was a
competitor in the wholesale market.
He stated that while the terms of the
contract could be construed to mean
that SER's obligation to sell
exclusively to PP & L is limited to
its capacity to satisfy its contractual
obligations, SER did not allege that
it sold, attempted to sell, or intended
to sell any excess capacity. He
further noted that, even if SER were
allowed to amend its complaint, it
would be able to allege only that it
has the capacity to sell more than
79.5 megawatts, not that it has
competed with PP & L in the
wholesale market. Therefore, Judge
Stapleton agreed with the majority's
decision to affirm the district court's
dismissal of SER's antitrust claim.
National Magazine Sweepstakes Are Not Illegal
Lotteries Under California Law
by Rana Abbasi
In Haskell v. Time, Inc., 965 F.
Supp. 1398 (E.D. Cal. 1997), a
federal district court granted partial
summary judgment in favor of mail-
order retailers who used sweep-
stakes offers in their magazine and
book marketing campaigns, holding
that Defendants' national magazine
sweepstakes were legal lotteries, that
Defendants' promotional mailings
were not false advertising, and that
Defendants' did not run their
sweepstakes in a misleading manner.
However, the court refused to grant
summary judgment on the issue of
whether Plaintiff had proved that a
"prompt-pay" sweepstakes was an
illegal lottery because there was
insufficient evidence to decide the
issue.
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Plaintiff Brought Action for
Violations of California's
Unfair Business Practices
Act
The court previously dismissed
Defendant Time Warner from the
suit in Haskell v. Time, Inc., 857 F.
Supp. 1392, 1405 (E.D. Cal. 1994).
The remaining Defendants, Publish-
ers Clearing House ("PCH"),
Reader's Digest Association
("RDA"), and American Family
Publishers ("AFP"), send thousands
of sweepstakes mailings annually to
persons identified as previous
customers, prior non-purchasing
sweepstakes participants, and
potential customers. The sweep-
stakes typically promise that if the
recipient returns the winning entry,
he or she will win millions of
dollars. Although the contests do not
condition winning upon the pur-
chase of magazine subscriptions or
books, purchasers of Defendants'
products receive multiple mailings
notifying them of the sweepstakes
and providing them with additional
sweepstakes numbers.
Plaintiff, Eben Haskell, a
recipient of mail-order magazine
advertising, brought suit on behalf
of himself and the general public of
California against Time Warner,
PCH, RDA, and AFP claiming that
the companies' solicitations violated
California law. Haskell argued that
the sweepstakes violated California
law in three ways: (1) the contests
were illegal lotteries; (2) statements
in the contests' promotional mail-
ings constituted false and misleading
advertising; and (3) Defendants
conducted the sweepstakes in a false
and misleading manner.
Plaintiff Had Standing to
Bring Unlawful Business
Practice Claim
Plaintiff brought suit against
Defendants claiming that they
violated California's criminal
statutes against illegal lotteries.
Defendants challenged Plaintiff's
standing to bring an action under
California's penal code because,
generally, private citizens do not
have the authority to bring suit
under the criminal law. In this case,
however, Plaintiff claimed that he
had standing to sue Defendants
under a criminal statute because of a
special provision under California's
Business and Professions Code ("B
& P Code"). This statute permits
private plaintiffs to bring a criminal
action on behalf of the State's
citizens to redress certain unlawful
business practices, including "unfair
competition." The Code defined
"unfair competition" as "any
unlawful, unfair or fraudulent
business act or practice and unfair,
deceptive, untrue or misleading
advertising." Haskell, 1997 WL
258893, at *2 (quoting CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1997)).
Defendants replied that the court
should not rely on the B & P Code
to find that Plaintiff had standing
because the California Supreme
Court had granted certiorari in
another case where a private
plaintiff had used the B & P Code to
obtain standing, thus questioning the
B & P Code's ability to provide
standing to private plaintiffs in
criminal actions. The court deter-
mined, however, that even though
the California Supreme Court was
reviewing a single case involving
the B & P Code's ability to provide
private plaintiffs with standing, there
were several other cases that had
relied on the B & P Code to do this,
and these cases were still good law.
The court reasoned that until the
California Supreme Court ruled that
the B & P Code's provision does not
grant standing in this type of
situation, the court could rely on the
code and case law precedent using
it. Therefore, it concluded that
Plaintiff had standing to bring an
action for injunctive relief against
Defendants under the criminal code.
Finding of Illegal Lottery
Required Proof of
Consideration
After determining that Plaintiff
had standing to bring an action, the
court considered the merit of his
individual claims. The court first
considered whether magazine
sweepstakes were illegal lotteries.
Plaintiff claimed that three particular
types of sweepstakes were illegal
lotteries: general sweepstakes,
customer-only sweepstakes, and
prompt-pay sweepstakes. To find
Defendants' various contests illegal,
the court required that Plaintiff show
the three necessary elements of an
illegal lottery, namely: prize,
chance, and consideration. Since
prizes and chance were present in
the sweepstakes, the remaining issue
was "whether [D]efendants' repeat
mailings amount[ed] to a require-
ment that consumers pay valuable
consideration to obtain entries for
the contests."
To prove the element of consider-
ation for the general sweepstakes,
Plaintiff argued that Defendants led
previous subscribers to believe that
they could buy additional sweep-
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stakes entries. Since purchasers of
Defendants' products received
sweepstakes entries with solicita-
tions to subscribe, Plaintiff argued
that consumers believed that
ordering books and magazines from
Defendants was consideration for
receiving additional entry opportuni-
ties. The court labeled this theory
"de facto consideration." Plaintiff
further argued that Defendants did
not distribute chances to win the
sweepstakes "in a random and
indiscriminate manner" since
Defendants sent more sweepstakes
entries to customers than to non-
customers.
After declaring that the theory of
de facto consideration is not
recognized under California law, the
court ruled that Plaintiff had not
proved the element of consideration
because Defendants did not promise
purchasers of their books and
magazines additional chances to
win. The court explained that no
purchase was required to win
because participants could receive
more entries by simply requesting
them from Defendants. The court
further reasoned that the nationwide
scope and random targeting of the
sweepstakes mailings undermined
Plaintiff's illegal lottery argument.
The court explained that the
sweepstakes operators' mass
mailings were distributed to pur-
chasers and non-purchasers alike in
a sufficiently indiscriminate fashion,
negating the implication that
consideration was required to
receive contest entries. The court
concluded that since Plaintiff had
not proved the essential element of
consideration, the general magazine
sweepstakes were not illegal
lotteries under California criminal
law and granted summary judgment
to Defendants on this issue.
The court next considered
whether Defendants' customer-only
sweepstakes were illegal lotteries
since qualifying for these contests
was conditioned upon having
ordered from Defendants in the past.
Plaintiff argued that customers
purchased products from Defendants
because they believed that a
purchase would lead to an offer of
entry into the customer-only
sweepstakes, thus constituting
consideration for the chance to play.
The court again dismissed this
theory of de facto consideration.
In reviewing Plaintiff's argument,
the court explained that "[c]ontests
with restricted eligibility require-
ments are legal, so long as the
[contests'] requirements are unre-
lated to the payment of consider-
ation." The court reasoned that the
money customers paid to subscribe
to Defendants' magazines was for
their products only, not for a chance
to enter a customer-only contest
which was not advertised at the time
of purchase. Thus, the court found
that the customer-only sweepstakes
was not illegal under California
criminal law.
Plaintiff also argued that AFP's
prompt-pay sweepstakes, another
customer-only sweepstakes, was an
illegal lottery. Plaintiff did not rely
on the de facto consideration theory.
Rather, he argued that the prompt-
pay sweepstakes required customers
to pay their bills for magazine
subscriptions early, and that this
early payment was itself consider-
ation. Citing the scarcity of facts in
the record, the court denied sum-
mary judgment on the single issue of
whether AFP's prompt-pay sweep-
stakes was an illegal lottery. The
court noted, however, that if the
eligibility requirement for the
prompt-pay sweepstakes - payment
by a certain due date - was a pre-
existing obligation of customers,
summary judgment would be
granted in favor of AFP. Summary
judgment would be proper in that
case since Plaintiff would have
failed to prove that consideration
was required for entry into a
prompt-pay sweepstakes.
The court found that Plaintiff
failed to prove that Defendants'
general, customer-only, and AFP's
prompt-pay sweepstakes were illegal
lotteries under California criminal
law. Except for Plaintiff's claim
against AFP's prompt-pay sweep-
stakes, the court ruled against each
of his illegal lottery claims.
Plaintiff Failed to Prove
Violation of California
Unfair Business Practices
Act
After granting summary judg-
ment on all but one of Plaintiff's
four illegal lottery claims, the court
examined Plaintiff's claims arising
under California's Unfair Business
Practices Act and determined that
Plaintiff failed to meet his eviden-
tiary burden for each of these
claims. To prove that Defendants
had engaged in unfair business
practices by sending allegedly
misleading sweepstakes bulletins,
Plaintiff was required to show,
without merely relying on anecdotal
evidence, that a reasonable customer
was likely to be misled by Defen-
dants' sweepstakes offers.
Plaintiff alleged that customers
were misled to believe that: (1) if
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they failed to return a sweepstakes
entry, they would forfeit their prior
entries; (2) if they failed to purchase
products, they would be dropped
from a publisher's mailing lists; and
(3) if they purchased additional
products, they would receive
preferential treatment and would,
therefore, have a better chance of
winning the contest.
In an attempt to prove Defen-
dants' statements were misleading,
Plaintiff pointed to "threats of
forfeiture" language in Defendants'
sweepstakes bulletins. An example
from a Publishers Clearing House
sweepstakes bulletin stated:
NOTICE OF FORFEITURE: Our
computer has assigned you 10 extra
SuperPrize numbers in the Publish-
ers Clearing House Sweepstakes.
And all ten of them are qualified to
win $1,000,000.00 and
$10,000,000.00, but you must get
your entry in on time. We don't want
to void your numbers and award any
prize money you might have coming
to you to someone else - but if you
don't mail your entry, we'll have no
choice. A Final Round entry
document bearing your ten numbers
is enclosed. Mail it at once to get 10
extra chances to win millions!
Plaintiff claimed such language
warned customers that their previous
entries would be forfeited unless
they returned the current entry on
time. In reviewing Plaintiff's
argument, the court reasoned that
the plain language of this excerpt,
and similar examples, did not
support Plaintiff's argument that
Defendants threatened retroactive
forfeiture. The court explained that
the statement on its face did not
mention any forfeiture of past
entries. In addition, the court noted
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that Plaintiff provided no statistical
evidence to show that Defendants'
statements confused or misled "a
significant portion of the popula-
tion."
Second, Plaintiff argued that
AFP's drop notices led potential
sweepstakes participants to believe
that they must purchase products in
order to stay on AFP's mailing lists.
A "drop notice" is a mailing warning
a customer that if they do not
respond to AFP's sweepstakes
bulletins, they may be taken off
AFP's mailing lists. The court found
that AFP's drop notices were not
false or misleading. The court cited
the plain language of the drop
notices which stated that a consumer
could either buy a product or write
to AFP to request to stay on its
mailing lists. The court concluded
that the drop notices would not
mislead a reasonable consumer.
Third, Plaintiff claimed that
Defendants favored repeat subscrib-
ers in their contests. To prove that
Defendants gave preferential
treatment to customers who had
purchased their products in the past,
Plaintiff pointed to Defendants'
statements in certain sweepstakes
notices. An example that Plaintiff
cited from Reader's Digest bulletin
stated,
" [because you've been loyal to
the company and displayed a faith
and trust in our products through
the years, we want to show our
loyalty to you. As a way of express-
ing our thanks, we gave preference
to [your] name to pass through the
initial stages of the Sweepstakes."
In reviewing Plaintiff's preferen-
tial treatment claim, the court held
that such statements promised
nothing and, hence, were a legal
form of advertising. Additionally,
the court concluded that since the
odds of winning were so slight, a
reasonable consumer would not
think that buying products would
give them substantially enhanced
odds of winning the sweepstakes
contests. Therefore, the court also
granted summary judgment to
Defendants on Plaintiff's claim that
Defendants gave preferential
treatment to repeat customers.
Plaintiff's related argument that
consumers received extra chances to
win if they bought Defendants'
products also did not convince the
court. The language Plaintiff cited in
support of this claim clearly stated
that consumers received extra
chances because they previously
entered a sweepstakes contest, not
because they had previously
purchased Defendants' products. In
addition to the plain language of
Plaintiff's examples, the court again
cited the lack of statistical evidence
showing that a reasonable consumer
would be misled by Defendants'
statements regarding extra prize
chances. The court granted Defen-
dants summary judgment on
Plaintiff's threats of forfeiture, drop
notices, preferential treatment, and
extra chances arguments because
Plaintiff failed to prove that the
statements in Defendants' sweep-
stakes bulletins were false or
misleading.
Defendants' Distribution
Plans Held Lawful
After addressing the issues of
threats of forfeiture, drop notices,
preferential treatment, and extra
chances arguments, the court
considered Plaintiff's challenge to
Volume 9, number 4
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Defendants' method of distributing
mailings and statements in their
mailings describing their distribu-
tion methods.
To be an unlawful business
practice, the challenged action must
be: (1) illegal; and (2) a business
practice. Because Plaintiff failed to
show that the distribution method
was illegal under the lottery statute,
the court granted summary judgment
to Defendants.
The court also granted summary
judgment to Defendants on the
second element of the distribution
count, the allegedly illegal state-
ments. The court found that the
sweepstakes' representations that
"'No Purchase Is Necessary' to win"
were not misleading or false, since
Plaintiff provided no evidence that
these statements were not true.
Pre-Selected Winning
Numbers Did Not Mislead
Customers
Plaintiff claimed that certain
publishers' statements regarding the
use of pre-selected winning numbers
also constituted misleading and false
advertising. These statements
referred to the dates of AFP's and
PCH's prize drawings and the
chances of winning the contests.
Plaintiff argued that since these
Defendants use pre-selected winning
numbers, they misrepresented how
often they held the drawings for
prizes. The court found, however,
that Defendants truthfully stated the
frequency of their prize drawings in
their mailings.
Additionally, Plaintiff claimed
that entries received earlier by the
publishers had a greater chance of
being the winning entry based on the
pre-selected entry scheme. Plaintiff,
however, failed to clearly explain
this theory to the court. Conse-
quently, the court granted summary
judgment to Defendants.
Defendants' Change in
Rules Did Not Mislead
Consumers
Finally, Plaintiff challenged an
alleged change in the prizes and
rules of a sweepstakes run by AFP.
AFP's Sweepstakes #27 changed six
$1 million prizes to one $10 million
prize. Plaintiff also claimed that an
AFP rule change appeared in some
mailings, but was omitted in others,
constituting false and misleading
statements. The court granted AFP
summary judgment on both of these
counts, finding that AFP's rules
authorized AFP to change prizes,
therefore no evidence supported
Plaintiff's argument that this rule
change misled consumers. The court
granted summary judgment due to
the insufficiency of Plaintiff's
evidence, the unlikelihood of
Defendants' statements misleading a
reasonable customer, and a plain-
reading of Defendants' sweepstakes
bulletins.
Thus, except for Plaintiff's
claims against AFP's prompt-pay
sweepstakes, the court granted
summary judgment to Defendants
on all of Plaintiff's claims since they
were not supported by law or
evidence. Although it denied
summary judgment to AFP on the
issue of whether AFP's prompt-pay
sweepstakes required illegal
consideration, the court found that
all of the other challenged sweep-
stakes were not illegal under
California criminal law. Addition-
ally, the court did not find any of
Defendants' sweepstakes advertising
or statements regarding their
methods of running the sweepstakes
false or misleading.
Virginia Consumer Protection Statutes Fail to
Protect Business in its Capacity as a Competitor
By Philip Tortorich
Deceit, fraud and misrepresenta-
tion - these are the problems that
states seek to combat with consumer
protection laws. While the state laws
do not use the same wording, the
main focus of all of these laws is to
protect consumers from dishonest
suppliers. Courts have had to answer
an ancillary issue concerning
whether a supplier of goods has
standing to sue its competitor under
these consumer protection laws. In
H.D. Oliver Funeral Apartments,
Inc. v. Dignity Funeral Services,
Inc., 964 F. Supp. 1033 (E.D. Va.
1997), a district court addressed this
issue and held that a supplier did not
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